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Absract:	  In	  an	  earlier	  issue,	  I	  argue	  (2014)	  that	  psychology	  and	  epistemology	  
should	  distinguish	  religious	  credence	  from	  factual	  belief.	  These	  are	  distinct	  
cognitive	  attitudes.	  Levy	  (2017)	  rejects	  this	  distinction,	  arguing	  that	  both	  
religious	  and	  factual	  “beliefs”	  are	  subject	  to	  “shifting”	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  fluency	  and	  
“intuitiveness.”	  Levy’s	  theory,	  however,	  (1)	  is	  out	  of	  keeping	  with	  much	  research	  
in	  cognitive	  science	  of	  religion	  and	  (2)	  misrepresents	  the	  notion	  of	  factual	  belief	  
employed	  in	  my	  theory.	  So	  his	  claims	  don’t	  undermine	  my	  distinction.	  I	  conclude	  
by	  suggesting	  some	  approaches	  to	  empirically	  testing	  our	  views.	  
	  
0.	  Introduction:	  Representation-­‐Discrepant	  Behavior	  
Should	  psychology	  and	  epistemology	  recognize	  religious	  credence	  as	  a	  distinct	  attitude	  
from	  factual	  belief?	  In	  other	  words,	  is	  the	  cognitive	  attitude	  one	  typically	  has	  when	  one	  
“believes”	  Jesus	  Christ	  is	  alive	  different	  from	  the	  attitude	  one	  typically	  has	  when	  one	  “believes”	  
one’s	  cat	  is	  alive?	  Both	  underlying	  attitudes—ways	  of	  relating	  to	  and	  processing	  
representations—can	  be	  called	  “belief.”1	  But	  I	  argue	  (2014),	  appealing	  to	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  
evidence,	  that	  they	  are	  different.	  My	  longer	  paper	  gives	  a	  full	  theoretical	  description	  of	  the	  
difference,	  but	  for	  present	  purposes	  we	  can	  think	  of	  factual	  belief	  as	  a	  very	  matter-­‐of-­‐fact	  way	  
of	  relating	  to	  descriptive	  contents,	  while	  religious	  credence	  is	  a	  reverential,	  identity-­‐
constituting	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  descriptive	  contents.	  Levy	  (2017),	  however,	  attempts	  to	  deny	  my	  
distinction	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  “fluency”	  and	  “intuitiveness”	  of	  processing	  various	  
representations	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  relevant	  data.	  If	  fluency	  and	  intuitiveness	  can	  do	  the	  
explanatory	  work,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  posit	  my	  distinction.	  Or	  so	  he	  seems	  to	  think.2	  
Levy	  and	  I	  do	  agree	  about	  an	  important	  fact	  that	  frames	  our	  disagreement.	  Religious	  
“believers”	  often	  do	  not	  act	  on	  their	  internal	  religious	  representations	  in	  ways	  one	  would	  
expect,	  if	  those	  representations	  were	  straightforward,	  fluently	  processed	  factual	  beliefs	  
(however	  one	  understands	  those	  terms).	  Here	  are	  some	  examples.	  
	   Once-­‐a-­‐week	  Christians,	  against	  whom	  preachers	  rail,	  exemplify	  that	  many	  Christian	  
“belief”	  attitudes	  are	  inoperative	  six	  days	  a	  week.	  And	  Edelman	  (2009)	  shows	  that	  on	  Sundays	  
people	  in	  predominantly	  Christian	  states	  look	  at	  pornography	  less	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
population,	  but	  they	  look	  at	  it	  more	  during	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  week.	  Charitable	  giving	  shows	  the	  
opposite	  pattern	  (Malhotra,	  2008).	  A	  factual	  belief	  that	  God	  is	  always	  watching,	  however,	  
should	  lower	  pornography	  use	  to	  some	  extent	  every	  day,	  so	  it’s	  puzzling	  why	  internal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  It	  seems	  likely,	  however,	  that	  when	  people	  use	  verbs	  for	  such	  mental	  states,	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  use	  “believe”	  
for	  religious	  credences	  and	  “think”	  for	  factual	  beliefs	  (Heiphetz,	  Landers,	  and	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  in	  preparation).	  Note	  
also	  that	  this	  kind	  of	  distinction	  doesn’t	  only	  apply	  to	  religious	  credence	  and	  factual	  belief.	  Bloom	  (2015),	  for	  
example,	  generalizes	  my	  original	  notion	  of	  credence	  into	  the	  political/ideological	  realm.	  
2	  There	  are	  several	  components	  to	  Levy’s	  paper.	  For	  reasons	  of	  space,	  I	  focus	  on	  those	  I	  take	  to	  be	  most	  central.	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representations	  with	  God-­‐is-­‐watching	  contents	  don’t	  inhibit	  “sinful”	  behavior	  more	  generally	  
(Dennett,	  2006).	  	  
	   Members	  of	  the	  Vezo	  tribe	  in	  Madagascar,	  to	  give	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  example,	  report	  
different	  things	  about	  ongoing	  psychological	  capacities	  of	  deceased	  ancestors,	  depending	  on	  
whether	  they	  are	  probed	  in	  a	  ritual	  context	  (Harris	  and	  Astuti,	  2008).	  They	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  say	  
that	  an	  ancestor	  can	  see	  or	  think	  when	  asked	  in	  a	  non-­‐ritual	  setting,	  and	  Levy	  and	  I	  agree	  that	  
this	  merits	  reflection.	  Similar	  results	  emerge	  in	  studies	  in	  Spain	  (Harris	  and	  Giménez,	  2005),	  in	  
Austin,	  Texas,	  and	  on	  the	  Melanesian	  island	  Vanuatu	  (Watson-­‐Jones	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  
	   A	  religious	  geologist,	  to	  turn	  to	  a	  different	  domain,	  can	  compartmentalize	  his	  “belief”	  in	  
Young	  Earth	  Creationism,	  ensuring	  that	  it	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  his	  scientific	  thinking	  and	  practices	  
in	  the	  lab	  or	  in	  the	  field,	  though	  he	  professes	  it	  in	  church	  (Dean,	  2007;	  Ross,	  personal	  
communication).	  But	  that	  is	  strange,	  since	  if	  he	  factually	  believed	  it,	  he	  should	  think	  that	  such	  
apparent	  knowledge3	  might	  lead	  to	  breakthrough.	  	  
	   And	  Shariff	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  offer	  a	  meta-­‐analysis	  that	  shows	  religious	  primes	  make	  a	  
significant	  difference	  to	  how	  prosocial	  “believers”	  are.	  Religious	  “beliefs”	  do	  not	  increase	  
prosociality	  (such	  as	  charitable	  giving)	  all	  the	  time,	  but	  only	  when	  they	  are	  primed.	  Muslim	  
shopkeepers	  in	  Morocco,	  relatedly,	  selected	  the	  most	  altruistic	  option	  for	  charitable	  giving	  in	  
one-­‐shot	  games	  within	  a	  short	  time	  after	  hearing	  the	  call	  to	  prayer,	  but	  the	  effect	  was	  
transient.	  
	  
Interestingly,	  the	  data	  collected	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  had	  passed	  since	  the	  most	  
recent	  call	  to	  prayer	  suggests	  that	  this	  effect	  is	  short-­‐lived.	  While	  100%	  of	  participants	  
who	  responded	  while	  the	  prayer	  was	  audible	  chose	  the	  most	  charitable	  option,	  less	  
than	  50%	  of	  those	  who	  responded	  in	  the	  20	  minutes	  following	  the	  call	  to	  prayer	  did.	  
(Duhaime,	  2015:	  595)	  
	  
Studies	  show	  that	  representing	  God	  as	  punitive	  underlies	  religious	  prosociality:	  God	  punishes	  
people	  who	  do	  not	  cooperate	  (Norenzayan	  et	  al.	  2016;	  Yilmaz	  and	  Bahçekapili	  2016).	  So	  it	  is	  
puzzling	  why	  many	  people	  are	  motivated	  to	  avoid	  divine	  punishment	  only	  in	  certain	  contexts.	  
The	  brevity	  of	  the	  prosociality	  effect	  is	  striking.	  
	   To	  have	  a	  general	  term,	  let’s	  use	  “representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior”	  to	  refer	  to	  
behaviors	  that	  diverge	  from	  what	  one	  would	  do,	  if	  one’s	  relevant	  “beliefs”	  were	  
straightforward,	  well-­‐understood	  factual	  beliefs.	  There	  are	  many	  kinds	  of	  representation-­‐
discrepant	  behavior.	  The	  examples	  above	  are	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behaviors.	  
	   This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  disagreement:	  while	  wholeheartedly	  agreeing	  it	  exists,	  Levy	  and	  I	  
have	  different	  strategies	  for	  explaining	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior.	  	  
	   Levy’s	  explanation	  is	  that	  the	  processing	  of	  many	  religious	  beliefs	  is	  disfluent,	  which	  
makes	  them	  lack	  “intuitiveness.”	  That	  means	  they	  can	  be	  hard	  to	  think	  with,	  to	  understand,	  and	  
sometimes	  to	  retrieve	  (disfluency),	  which	  makes	  a	  difference	  to	  whether	  they	  “seem	  to	  be	  true	  
to	  the	  agent”	  (intuitiveness,	  110).	  Context,	  however,	  makes	  a	  difference.	  In	  religious	  contexts,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  As	  Sperber	  writes,	  “From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  ‘believing’	  subject,	  factual	  beliefs	  are	  just	  plain	  ‘knowledge,’	  
while	  representational	  beliefs	  could	  be	  called	  ‘convictions,’	  ‘persuasions,’	  ‘opinions,’	  ‘beliefs,’	  and	  the	  like”	  (1985:	  
52).	  This	  perspective	  suggests	  that	  Ross’s	  “belief”	  in	  Young	  Earth	  Creationism	  does	  not	  lie	  on	  the	  factual	  belief	  side	  
of	  the	  divide.	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religious	  beliefs	  are	  processed	  more	  fluently,	  so	  they	  may	  become	  intuitive	  and	  ripe	  for	  guiding	  
behavior.	  Levy	  writes,	  “Processing	  fluency	  is	  sensitive	  to	  context,	  because	  context	  affects	  
whether	  representations	  are	  retrieved,	  how	  easily	  they	  are	  retrieved	  and	  how	  fluently	  they	  are	  
processed”	  (115).	  
	   My	  explanation	  for	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior	  is	  that	  many	  religious	  
“beliefs”—religious	  credences—are	  not	  factual	  beliefs	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Rather,	  they	  are	  
secondary	  cognitive	  attitudes,	  which	  do	  not	  play	  as	  widespread	  a	  role	  in	  guiding	  inference	  and	  
action	  as	  factual	  beliefs	  do,	  though	  they	  still	  provide	  normative	  orientation	  and	  are	  identity	  
constituting	  (among	  other	  distinctive	  properties).	  Thus,	  religious	  credences	  often	  cease	  guiding	  
actions	  in	  non-­‐religious	  contexts	  for	  reasons	  that,	  contra	  Levy,	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  how	  
fluently	  they	  are	  processed.	  Ideas	  like	  God	  is	  watching	  or	  God	  punishes	  sinners	  are	  perfectly	  
easy	  to	  understand	  (they	  are	  fluent	  and	  intuitive),	  regardless	  of	  context.	  The	  fact	  that	  
“believers”	  often	  do	  not	  act	  in	  accord	  with	  those	  ideas	  is	  due	  to	  their	  attitude	  to	  them,	  which	  is	  
religious	  credence,	  not	  factual	  belief.	  Reverential	  attitudes	  are	  setting	  dependent	  in	  ways	  that	  
matter-­‐of-­‐fact	  attitudes	  are	  not.	  
	   Levy’s	  argument	  against	  my	  position	  appears	  to	  have	  two	  aspects.	  First,	  he	  thinks	  his	  
appeal	  to	  lack	  of	  intuitiveness	  explains	  the	  relevant	  data.	  Second,	  he	  thinks	  that	  “factual	  
beliefs”	  themselves	  are	  also	  subject	  to	  context-­‐based	  “shifting.”	  Taking	  these	  points	  together,	  
he	  seems	  to	  think	  there	  is	  no	  basis	  for	  distinguishing	  religious	  credence	  from	  factual	  belief.	  The	  
main	  purpose	  of	  this	  present	  paper,	  correspondingly,	  is	  to	  make	  two	  points:	  
	  
1. Levy	  is	  wrong	  to	  think	  that	  the	  relevant	  religious	  ideas	  are	  not	  intuitive;	  that	  view	  is	  out	  
of	  keeping	  with	  a	  mountain	  of	  empirical	  research	  in	  cognitive	  science	  of	  religion.	  
	  
2. Levy’s	  title	  claim—that	  religious	  beliefs	  are	  factual	  beliefs—is	  only	  plausible	  if	  one	  uses	  
the	  phrase	  “factual	  belief”	  in	  a	  loose	  way	  that	  misrepresents	  the	  meaning	  I	  give	  it	  as	  a	  
term	  of	  art,	  so	  his	  arguments	  don’t	  logically	  impinge	  on	  the	  distinction	  I	  in	  fact	  draw.	  	  
	  
Since	  Levy’s	  explanation	  strategy	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  work	  (point	  1),	  that	  leaves	  my	  approach	  as	  a	  
contender	  for	  explaining	  the	  sorts	  of	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior	  mentioned	  
above.	  After	  making	  points	  1	  and	  2	  in	  Sections	  1	  and	  2,	  I	  conclude	  by	  suggesting	  research	  
directions	  that	  could	  both	  test	  and	  deepen	  my	  view.	  
	   Two	  brief	  logical	  points	  are	  necessary	  before	  moving	  on.	  First,	  Levy	  and	  I	  both	  recognize	  
that	  religious	  behavior	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  varied	  enough	  domain	  that	  no	  single	  theory	  will	  cover	  
all	  the	  psychologically	  interesting	  data—far	  from	  it.	  So	  our	  dispute	  is	  about	  which	  theory	  will	  be	  
more	  fruitful	  for	  explaining	  patterns	  in	  the	  extant	  research	  and	  generating	  more	  research	  in	  the	  
future.	  Second,	  there	  is	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  our	  positions:	  Levy	  denies	  my	  distinction,	  but	  I	  
don’t	  deny	  that	  disfluency	  and	  lack	  of	  intuitiveness	  are	  real	  phenomena.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  I	  can	  
hold	  that	  some	  religious	  credences	  are	  unintuitive,	  like	  those	  that	  encode	  theologically	  abstruse	  
doctrines;	  I	  just	  don’t	  think	  that	  all	  or	  even	  most	  are,	  which	  is	  why	  Levy’s	  approach	  won’t	  work.	  	  
	  
1.	  Intuitive	  Religious	  Representations	  
	   Levy	  thinks	  the	  un-­‐intuitiveness	  of	  many	  religious	  beliefs	  resembles	  the	  un-­‐intuitiveness	  
of	  scientific	  beliefs:	  “they	  do	  not	  differ	  from	  many	  scientific	  beliefs	  in	  being	  counterintuitive”	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(112).	  Elsewhere,	  Levy	  assimilates	  the	  “practical	  setting	  dependence”	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  to	  that	  
of	  beliefs	  about	  physics:	  “adults	  with	  college	  level	  education	  in	  mechanics	  invoke	  folk	  physics	  to	  
explain	  and	  predict	  motion	  .	  .	  .	  .	  This	  exhibits	  the	  practical	  setting	  dependence	  of	  factual	  beliefs	  
.	  .	  .	  ”	  (111).	  While	  this	  passage	  doesn’t	  use	  the	  phrase	  “practical	  setting	  dependence”	  according	  
to	  my	  intended	  meaning,	  it	  does	  show	  that	  Levy	  thinks	  much	  the	  same	  thing	  is	  going	  on	  when	  
religious	  “beliefs”	  fail	  to	  guide	  behavior	  as	  when	  reflective	  beliefs	  about	  physics	  fail.	  	  
	   Simply	  put,	  Levy	  thinks	  the	  religious	  person	  who	  does	  not	  act	  on	  her	  religious	  “beliefs”	  is	  
like	  the	  physicist	  who	  does	  not	  use	  d=½	  gt2	  to	  estimate	  in	  real	  time	  when	  a	  ball	  will	  hit	  the	  
ground:	  the	  processing	  is	  too	  unintuitive	  to	  be	  real-­‐time	  workable.4	  On	  his	  view,	  processing	  God	  
is	  watching	  is	  disfluent	  and	  unintuitive	  in	  the	  way	  that	  processing	  d=½	  gt2	  is,	  which	  is	  why	  
religious	  people	  don’t	  act	  on	  it	  much	  of	  the	  time.	  (More	  precisely,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  that	  
representation	  isn’t	  used,	  that	  is	  because	  it’s	  disfluent	  and	  unintuitive.)	  	  
Levy	  produces	  almost	  no	  evidence,	  however,	  that	  culturally	  widespread	  representations	  
of	  the	  supernatural,	  such	  as	  we	  find	  in	  most	  religious	  credences,	  are	  disfluently	  processed;	  in	  
fact,	  none	  of	  the	  articles	  on	  disfluency	  he	  cites	  are	  about	  religious	  ideas.	  So	  his	  view	  that	  
religious	  representations	  are	  disfluent	  and	  unintuitive	  amounts	  to	  being	  theoretical	  conjecture.	  
	   Unfortunately,	  his	  conjecture	  is	  out	  of	  keeping	  with	  central	  results	  in	  cognitive	  science	  
of	  religion.	  While	  most	  theorists,	  including	  myself,	  agree	  that	  abstruse	  theological	  doctrines	  are	  
unintuitive	  (Barrett,	  1999;	  McCauley,	  2011),	  much	  empirical	  work	  supports	  the	  idea	  that	  
popular	  representations	  of	  the	  supernatural	  are	  culturally	  successful	  because	  they	  trigger	  and	  
are	  processed	  by	  intuitive	  systems	  that	  evolved	  for	  other	  purposes.	  This	  intuitive	  by-­‐product	  
view	  of	  religious	  representations	  is	  supported	  by	  anthropological	  fieldwork	  (Boyer,	  2001),	  
experimental	  psychology	  (Barrett	  and	  Keil,	  1996;	  Atran	  and	  Norenzayan	  2004a,	  2004b),	  and	  
empirically	  based	  theory	  (McCauley,	  2011).	  	  
	   Levy’s	  view	  that	  “[religious	  beliefs]	  do	  not	  differ	  from	  many	  scientific	  beliefs	  in	  being	  
counterintuitive”	  sits	  ill	  with	  the	  evidence	  that	  McCauley	  (2011)	  marshals	  in	  his	  book	  Why	  
Religion	  Is	  Natural	  And	  Science	  Is	  Not.	  McCauley’s	  main	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  ideas	  of	  popular	  
religion	  are	  culturally	  successful	  because	  they	  are	  suited	  to	  being	  processed	  by	  intuitive	  
(“maturationally	  natural”)	  cognitive	  systems,	  such	  as	  intuitive	  biology	  and	  psychology;	  in	  this	  
they	  differ	  from	  scientific	  ideas,	  which	  are	  not	  suited	  to	  intuitive	  processing.	  	  	  
	  
Religion	  in	  its	  popular,	  that	  is,	  widespread,	  forms	  incorporates	  assumptions	  that	  are	  
more	  common,	  materials	  that	  are	  more	  familiar,	  and	  judgments	  that	  are	  more	  intuitive	  
than	  is	  the	  case	  with	  either	  science	  or	  theology.	  Religion	  in	  this	  sense	  employs	  ideas	  and	  
forms	  of	  thought	  that	  are	  naturally	  appealing	  to	  the	  human	  mind,	  because	  they	  are	  
rooted	  in	  maturationally	  natural	  cognitive	  dispositions	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  knowledge	  they	  
support,	  which	  are	  available	  to	  most	  children	  by	  the	  time	  they	  reach	  school	  age.	  (154)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Physicists	  have	  sophisticated	  theories	  of	  how	  the	  world	  works.	  But	  importantly,	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  in	  which	  
people’s	  intuitive	  physics	  departs	  from	  physicists’	  theories,	  even	  among	  the	  physicists	  themselves	  (McCloskey,	  
1983).	  Even	  physics	  teachers	  make	  errors	  about	  factors	  that	  influence	  how	  fast	  a	  wheel	  rolls	  down	  a	  hill	  or	  in	  
predicting	  the	  trajectory	  of	  a	  ball	  shooting	  out	  of	  a	  curved	  tube	  (Proffitt	  and	  Kaiser,	  2006).	  That’s	  because	  doing	  
theory-­‐based	  calculations	  requires	  slow,	  reflective	  thinking.	  Processing	  physical	  theory	  is	  not	  intuitive.	  So	  here	  is	  
one	  paradigm	  to	  which	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior	  might	  be	  compared:	  the	  physicist	  who	  doesn’t	  
act	  on	  her	  theoretical	  physical	  beliefs	  outside	  of	  academic	  settings	  because	  those	  theories	  aren’t	  intuitive.	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   Several	  bodies	  of	  evidence	  suggest	  that	  ideas	  about	  the	  supernatural	  are	  ripe	  for	  
intuitive	  processing.	  First,	  research	  shows	  that	  analytic	  thinking	  styles	  and	  analytic	  priming	  are	  
associated	  with	  lower	  measures	  of	  professed	  religious	  “belief,”	  while	  intuitive	  thinkers	  and	  
intuitive	  thinking	  are	  positively	  correlated	  with	  religious	  thought	  (Gervais	  and	  Norenzayan,	  
2012;	  Pennycook,	  2014;	  Shenhav,	  Rand,	  and	  Greene,	  2011).	  Second,	  representations	  of	  
divinities—both	  in	  the	  lab	  and	  in	  the	  field—have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  minimally	  counterintuitive;	  
this	  means	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  supernatural	  agent	  typically	  activates	  the	  default	  inference	  
patterns	  that	  accompany	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  person,	  with	  only	  a	  small	  number	  of	  intuitive	  violations,	  
like	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  able	  to	  know	  all	  strategic	  social	  information	  (Boyer,	  2001;	  Atran	  and	  
Norenzayan,	  2004a).	  Logically,	  the	  flipside	  of	  being	  “minimally”	  counterintuitive	  is	  being	  mostly	  
intuitive.	  Third,	  there	  is	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  intuitive	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  
theologically	  correct	  ones;	  the	  intuitive	  ones	  are	  those	  that	  play	  the	  larger	  role	  in	  how	  people	  
think	  and	  pray	  (Barrett,	  1999;	  Barrett,	  2001).	  In	  short,	  contra	  Levy,	  intuitiveness	  is	  a	  hallmark	  of	  
religious	  representation,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  popular	  religious	  ideas,	  as	  opposed	  to	  
esoteric	  theology.	  And	  it	  is	  not	  just	  theological	  doctrines	  that	  are	  practical	  setting	  dependent;	  
intuitive	  ideas	  like	  God	  is	  watching	  also	  do	  not	  guide	  behavior	  in	  all	  settings,	  as	  my	  introductory	  
examples	  show.	  	  
	   Let’s	  return	  to	  the	  Moroccan	  shopkeepers	  Duhaime	  investigates.	  How	  would	  Levy	  
explain	  their	  giving	  so	  much	  more	  to	  charity	  when	  the	  call	  to	  prayer	  is	  sounding	  than	  when	  it	  
isn’t?	  Levy	  has	  to	  say	  that	  when	  they	  hear	  the	  call,	  that	  suddenly	  makes	  their	  representations	  of	  
God	  is	  watching	  more	  “fluent”	  and	  hence	  more	  “intuitive.”	  When	  the	  call	  is	  not	  sounding,	  such	  
representations	  return	  to	  being	  disfluent	  and	  unintuitive.	  But	  it	  is	  not	  so:	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  call	  
to	  prayer	  triggers	  such	  representations	  so	  easily	  makes	  it	  much	  more	  likely	  that	  those	  
representations	  were	  intuitive	  all	  along,	  though	  just	  not	  active	  in	  guiding	  behavior	  outside	  the	  
short-­‐lived	  religious	  setting.5	  	  
	   The	  same	  point	  goes	  for	  the	  other	  examples	  of	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  
behavior.	  Young	  Earth	  Creationism	  does	  not	  become	  disfluent	  or	  unintuitive,	  just	  because	  one	  
is	  in	  a	  scientific	  setting,	  as	  Levy	  would	  admit	  (111),	  but	  for	  many	  it	  is	  compartmentalized	  
nonetheless6.	  The	  “belief”	  that	  the	  ancestors	  can	  still	  think	  is	  not	  unintuitive	  in	  any	  setting,	  as	  
Levy	  seems	  to	  grant	  (note	  “the	  persistence	  of	  dualistic	  intuitions”	  on	  his	  p.	  113),	  but	  that	  
“belief”	  is	  practical	  setting	  dependent	  nonetheless,	  as	  Harris	  and	  colleagues	  show.	  And	  the	  idea	  
that	  God	  views	  pornography	  as	  sinful	  is	  just	  as	  intuitive	  Monday	  through	  Saturday	  as	  it	  is	  
Sunday,	  though	  it	  typically	  governs	  behavior	  only	  on	  the	  Sabbath.	  Lack	  of	  intuitiveness	  is	  not	  a	  
plausible	  explanation	  for	  any	  of	  these	  phenomena	  to	  begin	  with,	  and	  it	  is	  even	  less	  so	  in	  light	  of	  
the	  empirical	  research	  mentioned	  in	  this	  section.	  	  
	   There	  is	  a	  further	  structural	  problem	  with	  Levy’s	  theory.	  As	  Alter	  and	  Oppenheimer	  
(2009)	  characterize	  it,	  disfluency	  is	  a	  metacognitive	  experience	  that	  tends	  to	  influence	  people	  
to	  judge	  some	  information	  as	  less	  true	  and	  to	  engage	  analytic	  processing	  (among	  other	  things).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Daniel	  Oppenheimer	  (personal	  communication),	  whose	  work	  on	  fluency	  Levy	  extensively	  cites,	  informs	  me	  that	  
he	  does	  not	  find	  it	  plausible	  that	  disfluency	  would	  set	  in	  in	  such	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  	  
6	  Keep	  in	  mind	  that	  our	  task	  is	  to	  explain	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  is	  compartmentalized,	  not	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  it	  isn’t	  
(if	  such	  cases	  are	  ever	  fully	  genuine,	  as	  opposed	  to	  elaborate	  pretense).	  	  
	   6	  
Thus,	  if	  religious	  representations	  are	  processed	  disfluently	  outside	  of	  certain	  contexts,	  as	  Levy	  
maintains,	  then	  their	  introduction	  should	  trigger	  analytic	  processing.	  But	  that	  is	  just	  not	  what	  
happens;	  introducing	  religious	  representations	  into	  a	  situation	  easily	  primes	  religious	  thought,	  
as	  Shariff	  and	  colleagues	  show	  (in	  my	  terms,	  it	  activates	  the	  religious	  practical	  setting).	  And	  the	  
literature	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  religious	  belief	  and	  analytic	  cognitive	  style	  suggests	  that	  
religious	  belief	  is	  associated	  with	  intuitive	  thinking	  as	  opposed	  to	  analytic	  thinking	  (Pennycook,	  
2014).	  So	  while	  Levy’s	  view—in	  conjunction	  with	  background	  facts	  about	  disfluency—predicts	  
that	  introducing	  religious	  concepts	  into	  an	  otherwise	  non-­‐religious	  situation	  will	  trigger	  analytic	  
processing	  (because	  of	  disfluency),	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  precisely	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  happens.7	  
	   In	  sum,	  Levy’s	  approach	  to	  explaining	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior	  is	  not	  
promising.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  theological	  doctrines	  are	  unintuitive.	  But	  maintaining	  that	  culturally	  
popular	  religious	  “beliefs”	  are	  unintuitive	  (1)	  doesn’t	  cohere	  with	  well-­‐established	  data,	  (2)	  
doesn’t	  explain	  the	  examples	  it	  should	  explain,	  and	  (3)	  makes	  a	  prediction	  we	  already	  have	  
reason	  to	  think	  is	  not	  true.	  In	  short,	  the	  physicist	  who	  doesn’t	  always	  use	  her	  theoretical	  beliefs	  
is	  not	  a	  good	  paradigm	  for	  explaining	  religious	  believers	  whose	  “beliefs”	  are	  often	  
compartmentalized.	  
	  
2.	  What	  Are	  Factual	  Beliefs?	  
	   In	  section	  2	  of	  my	  (2014)	  paper,	  I	  characterize	  mental	  states	  I	  call	  “factual	  beliefs.”	  Three	  
points	  about	  that	  discussion	  are	  relevant	  here.	  First,	  “factual	  belief”	  for	  me	  is	  a	  term	  of	  art	  that	  
refers	  to	  mental	  states	  that	  have	  the	  features	  my	  theory	  describes	  (practical	  setting	  
independence,	  widespread	  cognitive	  governance,	  and	  evidential	  vulnerability).	  Second,	  the	  
empirical	  evidence	  and	  commonsense	  examples	  I	  cite	  support	  the	  existence	  claim	  that	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  mental	  states	  fits	  my	  definition	  of	  “factual	  belief.”	  Most	  such	  mental	  states	  have	  
relatively	  mundane	  contents,	  like	  my	  house	  has	  two	  outside	  doors	  or	  dogs	  have	  teeth,	  though	  in	  
principle	  any	  descriptive	  content	  can	  be	  the	  content	  of	  a	  factual	  belief,	  since	  attitude	  and	  
content	  are	  independent.	  Content	  is	  heuristic	  of	  attitude	  type,	  but	  no	  more.8	  Third,	  my	  theory	  
draws	  a	  crucial	  distinction	  between	  factual	  beliefs	  and	  other	  cognitive	  attitudes,	  like	  fictional	  
imaginings,	  hypotheses,	  assumptions	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument,	  etc.,	  which	  I	  call	  secondary	  
cognitive	  attitudes	  and	  which	  lack	  the	  defining	  properties	  of	  factual	  belief.	  	  
	   Thus,	  when	  I	  argue	  that	  religious	  credences	  are	  not	  factual	  beliefs—they	  are	  secondary	  
cognitive	  attitudes—what	  that	  means	  is	  this:	  a	  great	  many	  religious	  cognitive	  attitudes	  exist	  
that	  lack	  the	  properties	  of	  factual	  belief	  as	  my	  theory	  describes	  them.	  This	  is	  interesting	  because	  
the	  differences	  between	  religious	  credence	  and	  factual	  belief	  parallel	  the	  differences	  between,	  
say,	  fictional	  imagining	  and	  factual	  belief	  (though	  credences	  have	  additional	  distinctive	  
properties	  as	  well).	  That	  possibility	  is	  theoretically	  exciting,	  because	  it	  implies	  that	  research	  
strategies	  that	  apply	  to	  the	  psychology	  of	  imagining	  and	  make-­‐believe	  can	  carry	  over	  to	  
religious	  thought	  and	  practice.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Daniel	  Oppenheimer	  (personal	  communication)	  helped	  me	  clarify	  this	  point.	  
8	  This	  has	  always	  been	  my	  perspective.	  That’s	  why	  Levy’s	  claims	  about	  lack	  of	  correlation	  are	  misleading.	  I	  never	  
claimed	  correlations	  between	  content	  and	  context	  dependence	  in	  any	  statistical	  sense.	  Rather,	  I	  used	  contents	  to	  
gesture	  at	  classes	  of	  attitudes	  that	  were	  worth	  characterizing	  theoretically,	  and	  then	  I	  characterized	  them.	  Once	  
the	  theory	  is	  in	  place	  and	  the	  notions	  are	  defined,	  finding	  correlations	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  collecting	  relevant	  
statistical	  data,	  which	  Levy	  hasn’t	  done	  in	  any	  case.	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   Levy	  does	  not	  recognize	  these	  crucial	  points.	  When	  he	  writes	  that	  “practical	  setting	  
dependence	  occurs	  with	  a	  range	  of	  factual	  beliefs,”	  he	  is	  either	  not	  talking	  about	  factual	  beliefs	  
in	  my	  defined	  sense,	  misconstruing	  what	  practical	  setting	  dependence	  is,	  or	  both.	  So	  when	  he	  
attempts	  to	  undermine	  my	  distinction	  by	  claiming	  that	  many	  “factual	  beliefs”	  exhibit	  “shifting”	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  religious	  attitudes	  do,	  his	  argument	  misses	  the	  mark.9	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  many	  examples	  he	  gives	  of	  “factual	  beliefs”	  do	  not	  have	  the	  sorts	  of	  
contents	  that	  are	  heuristic	  for	  factual	  belief	  (in	  my	  sense)	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  
	   On	  my	  view,	  people	  are	  apt	  to	  factually	  believe	  things	  like	  I	  have	  two	  dogs,	  dogs	  like	  
meat,	  the	  vet	  charges	  money	  for	  service,	  the	  vet	  has	  an	  office	  near	  my	  house,	  the	  monthly	  
mortgage	  on	  my	  house	  is	  n	  dollars,	  I	  have	  n	  +	  200	  dollars	  in	  the	  bank,	  the	  currency	  in	  the	  USA	  is	  
the	  dollar,	  there	  are	  fifty	  States	  in	  the	  USA,	  and	  so	  on.	  Such	  factual	  beliefs	  are	  so	  ordinary	  that	  
we	  hardly	  notice	  them,	  except	  when	  we	  update	  them	  (e.g.,	  I	  only	  have	  n	  -­‐	  200	  dollars	  in	  the	  
bank!).	  Factual	  beliefs	  constitute	  the	  “default	  cognitive	  background”	  of	  practical	  reasoning	  and	  
planning,	  as	  Bratman	  (1992)	  would	  put	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  are	  the	  mundane	  map	  of	  how	  
we	  take	  things	  to	  be	  in	  the	  constant	  background	  of	  reasoning	  and	  action.	  	  
	   Levy’s	  examples	  of	  “factual	  beliefs”	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  my	  view	  do	  not	  
have	  this	  default	  character.	  Believing	  that	  “the	  task	  was	  dull”	  (112)	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  factual	  
belief	  in	  my	  sense,	  because	  the	  content	  is	  partly	  evaluative	  (the	  same	  goes	  for	  Levy’s	  other	  
cognitive	  dissonance	  examples).	  Believing	  that	  one	  is	  unlikely	  to	  “buy	  a	  ferret	  or	  a	  gibbon	  or	  
some	  other	  kind	  of	  pet”	  (112)	  is	  a	  dubious	  example	  of	  a	  factual	  belief,	  because	  it	  is	  largely	  an	  
estimate	  of	  one’s	  future	  behavior	  based	  on	  preferences.	  And	  preferring	  to	  bet	  on	  an	  even	  
numbered	  roll	  on	  a	  fair	  die	  to	  betting	  on	  1,	  4,	  or	  6	  (112)	  is	  also	  not	  a	  factual	  belief,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  
preference—one	  that	  is	  relatively	  opaque.	  Better	  examples	  of	  factual	  beliefs	  in	  these	  domains	  
would	  have	  contents	  like	  I	  completed	  a	  task,	  ferrets	  are	  animals,	  or	  a	  die	  has	  six	  sides.	  The	  
differences	  are	  clear:	  these	  factual	  beliefs	  are	  so	  obvious	  that	  one	  scarcely	  notices	  them,	  yet	  
they	  feed	  into	  inference	  and	  practical	  reasoning	  generally	  and	  are	  available	  for	  use	  (when	  
relevant)	  across	  practical	  settings,	  unlike	  religious	  credences	  and	  unlike	  the	  dubious	  examples	  
of	  “factual	  beliefs”	  that	  Levy	  uses	  in	  attempting	  to	  put	  pressure	  on	  my	  theory.	  
	   In	  sum,	  when	  Levy	  argues	  that	  religious	  beliefs	  and	  factual	  beliefs	  are	  (or	  can	  be)	  similar	  
in	  terms	  of	  their	  “lability,”	  he	  appeals	  to	  examples	  that	  my	  theory	  does	  not	  count	  as	  factual	  
beliefs.10	  So	  neither	  the	  logic	  of	  his	  argument	  nor	  his	  examples	  undermine	  my	  distinction	  
between	  religious	  credence	  and	  factual	  belief.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  I	  make	  it	  quite	  clear	  that	  many	  “beliefs”	  that	  might	  be	  called	  “factual”	  in	  a	  loose,	  pre-­‐theoretic	  way	  won’t	  fall	  into	  
my	  theoretically	  clarified	  category	  of	  factual	  belief	  (706).	  Here	  is	  the	  crucial	  passage:	  “Many	  other	  ‘beliefs’	  face	  a	  
similar	  treatment.	  In	  these	  cases,	  the	  cognitive	  scientist	  using	  my	  framework	  owes	  us	  two	  things:	  first,	  evidence	  
that	  those	  states	  in	  fact	  lack	  the	  functional	  properties	  of	  factual	  beliefs,	  or	  if	  they	  lack	  only	  some,	  evidence	  of	  
which	  ones	  they	  lack;	  second,	  an	  empirically	  motivated	  theory	  of	  the	  characteristic	  features	  special	  to	  them.	  It	  
would	  be	  impossible	  in	  one	  article	  to	  complete	  these	  two	  tasks	  for	  every	  “belief”	  that	  is	  not	  a	  factual	  belief.	  There	  
are	  too	  many	  candidates:	  political	  beliefs,	  theoretical	  beliefs,	  metaphysical	  beliefs,	  etc.,	  all	  of	  which	  must	  be	  
addressed	  in	  due	  course.	  But	  we	  must	  start	  somewhere.	  I	  start	  with	  religious	  credence.”	  From	  this	  perspective,	  
Levy	  has	  just	  found	  some	  other	  so-­‐called	  “beliefs”	  that	  are	  not	  factual	  beliefs	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense.	  
10	  Things	  are	  slightly	  different	  in	  Levy’s	  section	  in	  which	  he	  disputes	  the	  evidential	  vulnerability	  of	  factual	  beliefs.	  
There,	  he	  appeals	  to	  examples	  that	  plausibly	  are	  factual	  beliefs,	  but	  it	  is	  less	  convincing	  that	  those	  examples	  lack	  
evidential	  vulnerability,	  since	  they	  do	  in	  fact	  comport	  with	  the	  body	  of	  evidence	  to	  which	  the	  agent	  selectively	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3.	  Future	  Directions	  
	   Let’s	  consider	  how	  sections	  1	  and	  2	  of	  this	  paper	  relate.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  points	  I	  just	  
made	  in	  section	  2,	  Levy	  might	  respond	  that	  he	  has	  a	  better	  way	  of	  explaining	  the	  data	  that	  are	  
of	  mutual	  interest,	  and	  in	  light	  of	  that	  better	  way,	  the	  notion	  of	  factual	  belief	  should	  be	  
reconceived	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  sense	  of	  his	  statements.	  On	  Levy’s	  view,	  there	  is	  one	  broad	  
kind	  of	  descriptive	  belief	  that	  encompasses	  religious	  and	  factual	  belief	  alike,	  and	  “shifting”	  and	  
“lability”	  are	  explained	  by	  disfluency	  and	  un-­‐intuitiveness	  across	  the	  board;	  he	  is	  aiming	  for	  
explanatory	  unity	  (Friedman,	  1974).	  We	  saw	  in	  section	  1,	  however,	  that	  Levy	  does	  not	  have	  a	  
promising	  way	  of	  explaining	  much	  data	  it	  should	  explain.	  It	  thus	  makes	  sense	  to	  look	  to	  attitude	  
type	  to	  explain	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  explained.	  This	  approach	  locates	  the	  unity	  in	  a	  different	  place:	  
religious	  credence	  falls	  in	  with	  the	  class	  of	  secondary	  cognitive	  attitudes.	  	  
Here	  is	  my	  paradigm	  for	  thinking	  about	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior:	  
the	  playground	  (not	  the	  physicist).	  In	  make-­‐believe	  play—on	  the	  playground,	  so	  to	  speak—a	  
child	  might	  give	  you	  a	  red	  block	  when	  you	  ask	  for	  a	  cookie,	  because	  she	  imagines	  as	  part	  of	  play	  
that	  red	  blocks	  are	  cookies.	  But	  if	  you	  are	  not	  in	  that	  make-­‐believe	  practical	  setting,	  asking	  for	  a	  
cookie	  won’t	  get	  the	  child	  to	  give	  you	  a	  red	  block,	  even	  if	  she	  had	  just	  recently	  been	  
representing	  them	  as	  such;	  she	  would	  be	  more	  apt	  to	  give	  you	  an	  actual	  cookie	  instead	  (Harris,	  
2000:	  Ch.	  2;	  cf.	  Walton	  1990:	  Part	  I).	  This	  is	  because	  fictional	  imagining,	  as	  I	  call	  it,	  is	  an	  attitude	  
that	  guides	  behavior	  in	  make-­‐believe	  settings/episodes	  but	  typically	  not	  otherwise.	  This	  feature	  
of	  imagining,	  practical	  setting	  dependence,	  persists	  in	  adults.	  Say	  you’re	  on	  an	  airplane	  and	  
happen	  to	  be	  daydreaming	  you’re	  a	  doctor;	  if	  there’s	  an	  announcement	  on	  the	  PA	  that	  a	  doctor	  
is	  needed,	  your	  imagining	  won’t	  get	  you	  to	  go	  up	  front	  (even	  though	  it	  has	  content	  relevant	  to	  
the	  announcement),	  because	  fictional	  imaginings	  guide	  behaviors	  in	  make-­‐believe	  play	  settings	  
but	  not	  in	  all	  settings.	  Fictional	  imaginings	  are	  practical	  setting	  dependent—they	  depend	  on	  the	  
playground	  or	  play	  setting	  (cf.	  Huizinga,	  1955).	  Religious	  credences	  have	  a	  similar	  property—
though	  it’s	  tied	  to	  religious	  and	  identity-­‐testing	  situations,	  as	  opposed	  to	  make-­‐believe	  play—
and	  this	  explains	  much	  religious	  representation-­‐discrepant	  behavior:	  religious	  credences	  tend	  
to	  turn	  off	  for	  purposes	  of	  guiding	  action	  outside	  their	  characteristic	  setting,	  just	  like	  we	  saw	  
with	  the	  Moroccan	  shopkeepers,	  the	  Vezo	  and	  their	  ancestors,	  the	  once-­‐a-­‐week	  Christians,	  and	  
the	  Creationist	  geologist.	  	  
	   Though	  this	  view	  may	  appear	  radical,	  it	  is	  not	  implausible	  when	  considered	  in	  relation	  to	  
extant	  findings.	  Luhrmann	  (2012),	  for	  example,	  finds	  that	  many	  evangelical	  Christians	  explicitly	  
play	  make-­‐believe	  games	  in	  order	  to	  make	  God	  “feel	  real.”	  My	  view	  is	  that	  much	  of	  the	  
psychological	  structure	  that	  supports	  make-­‐believe	  play—in	  particular,	  the	  capacity	  to	  have	  
secondary	  cognitive	  attitudes—underlies	  a	  much	  broader	  range	  of	  religious	  life	  than	  that,	  even	  
though	  religious	  “believers”	  may	  not	  be	  conscious	  (and	  often	  are	  not	  conscious)	  that	  this	  is	  
what’s	  going	  on.	  
	   What	  testable	  predictions	  does	  my	  framework	  offer?	  Here	  are	  three.	  
First,	  “playground”	  situations,	  where	  sacred	  spaces	  and	  times	  activate	  religious	  
representations,	  which	  tend	  to	  fall	  into	  disuse	  otherwise,	  are	  apt	  to	  be	  widespread	  features	  of	  
religious	  life	  (shrines,	  temples,	  prayer	  times,	  religious	  holidays,	  etc.).	  The	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
attends.	  See	  Kunda	  (1990)	  and	  Van	  Leeuwen	  (2008)	  for	  discussions	  of	  how	  belief	  and	  evidence	  relate	  in	  motivated	  
reasoning.	  
	   9	  
phenomena	  exist	  will	  tend	  to	  support	  or	  disconfirm	  my	  view	  that	  many	  religious	  “beliefs”	  are	  
practical	  setting	  dependent.	  This	  may	  sound	  trivial,	  but	  note	  that	  this	  focus	  makes	  available	  an	  
empirical	  way	  to	  help	  decide	  between	  my	  view	  and	  Levy’s:	  my	  view	  clearly	  makes	  this	  
prediction,	  while	  nothing	  about	  Levy’s	  view	  does.	  For	  him,	  failure	  to	  act	  on	  religious	  “beliefs”	  
results	  from	  processing	  difficulty.	  For	  me,	  it	  results	  from	  not	  being	  in	  the	  right	  setting,	  and	  
furthermore,	  that	  fact	  that	  people	  design	  physical	  spaces	  and	  choose	  special	  times	  to	  worship	  is	  
implicit	  acknowledgement	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  practical	  setting	  dependence	  exists.	  	  
Second,	  my	  view	  predicts	  that,	  since	  religious	  credence	  and	  factual	  belief	  are	  separate,	  
people	  typically	  won’t	  get	  confused	  between	  the	  actual	  physical	  nature	  of	  religious	  
props/artifacts	  and	  the	  supernatural	  identities	  that	  religious	  credences	  assign	  them.	  For	  
example,	  while	  professing	  that	  they	  are	  receiving	  “the	  body”	  of	  Christ,	  Catholics	  will	  not	  behave	  
as	  if	  they	  anticipate	  ingesting	  an	  actual	  piece	  of	  human	  flesh.11	  More	  generally,	  religious	  people	  
won’t	  lose	  track	  of	  the	  physical	  identities	  of	  the	  statues	  they	  pray	  before,	  and	  people	  who	  
sacrifice	  to	  deceased	  ancestors	  won’t	  expect	  them	  to	  show	  up	  and	  eat	  the	  meat	  that	  they,	  
according	  to	  religious	  credences,	  desire.	  In	  short,	  we	  can	  expect	  religious	  people	  to	  have	  a	  two-­‐
map	  cognitive	  structure,	  where	  the	  factual	  belief	  map	  keeps	  track	  of	  ordinary	  facts	  and	  the	  
religious	  credence	  map	  represents	  another	  layer	  of	  assigned	  identities.	  The	  same	  sorts	  of	  
evidence	  that	  shows	  that	  children	  do	  not	  confuse	  make-­‐believe	  identities	  with	  real	  ones	  
(Golumb	  and	  Kuersten,	  1996;	  Taylor,	  1999;	  Weisberg,	  2013)	  can,	  mutatis	  mutandis,	  also	  
support	  the	  view	  that	  religious	  credences	  are	  not	  confused	  with	  factual	  beliefs.	  Data	  collection	  
in	  the	  latter	  case	  will	  be	  trickier,	  since	  religious	  people,	  when	  aware	  their	  beliefs	  are	  being	  
probed,	  often	  feel	  compelled	  to	  re-­‐assert	  their	  credence.	  But	  suitable	  methods	  can	  be	  devised	  
to	  work	  around	  this	  task	  demand.	  Note	  that	  Levy’s	  view	  does	  not	  make	  the	  prediction	  of	  non-­‐
confusion;	  if	  anything,	  his	  view	  predicts	  there	  should	  be	  confusion,	  since	  religious	  and	  factual	  
beliefs	  are	  all	  of	  a	  piece,	  so	  data	  relevant	  to	  that	  prediction	  can	  help	  distinguish	  our	  views.	  
Third,	  it	  should	  eventually	  be	  possible	  to	  find	  neural	  signatures	  that	  distinguish	  religious	  
credences	  from	  factual	  beliefs.	  There	  are	  already	  some	  pertinent	  data;	  Fondevila	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  
present	  ERP	  data	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  neural	  processing	  of	  sentences	  about	  the	  supernatural	  (that	  
is,	  minimally	  counterintuitive	  entities)	  resembles	  neural	  processing	  of	  metaphorical	  language,	  
as	  opposed	  to	  literal.	  That	  finding	  is	  suggestive	  of	  my	  view,	  but	  far	  more	  evidence	  is	  desirable.12	  	  
It	  is	  in	  principle	  possible	  that	  in	  all	  three	  cases,	  or	  some	  of	  them,	  the	  predicted	  results	  
won’t	  materialize.	  Hence	  my	  view	  is	  empirically	  vulnerable,	  contrary	  to	  what	  some	  have	  
suggested	  (Boudry	  and	  Coyne,	  2016;	  cf.	  Van	  Leeuwen,	  2016).	  But	  as	  we	  know,	  empirical	  
vulnerability	  is	  a	  scientific	  virtue.	  Levy	  hasn’t	  shown	  my	  view	  to	  be	  wrong.	  But	  data	  could.	  I	  look	  
forward	  to	  finding	  out.	  
I’d	  like	  to	  thank	  Neil	  Levy	  for	  this	  stimulating	  exchange	  of	  ideas.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Some	  people	  respond	  in	  conversation	  to	  this	  kind	  of	  example	  by	  noting	  that	  Catholics	  distinguish	  substance	  and	  
accident.	  But	  such	  a	  distinction	  can’t	  explain	  why	  most	  Catholics	  who	  profess	  transubstantiation	  don’t	  expect	  
actual	  flesh	  (as	  opposed	  to	  a	  wafer),	  since	  most	  Catholics	  are	  unaware	  of	  the	  Thomistic	  distinction	  in	  question.	  If	  
one	  isn’t	  aware	  of	  a	  distinction,	  that	  distinction	  can’t	  explain	  one’s	  thought	  or	  behavior.	  
12	  Harris	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  offer	  a	  different	  perspective.	  I	  hold,	  however,	  that	  their	  interpretation	  of	  their	  own	  data	  is	  
highly	  tendentious.	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